

Philosophy of Mind

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OVERVIEW

These tutorials will cover eight topics in philosophy of mind.

Week 1: Physicalism I: The Type-Identity Thesis

Week 2: Physicalism II: Functionalism

Week 3: Physicalism III: Non-Reductive Physicalism

Week 4: Intentionality I: The Mark of the Mental

Week 5: Intentionality II: Is Mental Content Wide?

Week 6: Perception I: Sense-Datum Theories and Representationalism

Week 7: Perception II: Naïve Realism and Disjunctivism

Week 8: Epistemology of Mind: Other Minds or Self-Knowledge

POLICIES

- **Email me a copy of your essay either the morning before our tutorial (for an afternoon tutorial) or the evening before our tutorial (for a morning tutorial).**
- There are no 'silly questions' and tutorials are not formally assessed. Be **bold**. Be inquisitive.
- If you miss a tutorial, or arrive late, no compensating tutorial can be arranged. It *may* be possible to reschedule a tutorial in advance, but such requests will not necessarily be granted.

General Reading

David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson (2006). *Philosophy of Mind and Cognition: An Introduction*. Wiley-Blackwell.

David J. Chalmers (ed.) (2002). *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*. Oxford University Press. (Referred to below as CHALMERS)

Jaegwon Kim (2011). *Philosophy of Mind (Third Edition)*. Boulder: Westview Press. (Referred to below as KIM)

Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen (eds.) (2007). *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind*. Wiley-Blackwell.

John Heil (2012). *Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction (Third Edition)*. Routledge. (Referred to below as HEIL)

Week 1: Physicalism I: The Type-Identity Thesis

Background reading:

Ch.4 of KIM

Ch.5 of HEIL

It is nearly impossible to discuss the identity theory without some understanding its chief rival: functionalism (see, e.g., Putnam (1967), and the multiple realizability objection). Some introductory material on functionalism is here: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalist/#WhaFun>

For the Identity Theory:

J. J. C. Smart (1959). "Sensations and Brain Processes." *Philosophical Review* 68 (April):141-56. Reprinted in CHALMERS

Christopher S. Hill (1991). *Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism*. Cambridge University Press. Ch.2: "The Failings of Dualism and the Dual Aspect Theory."

David Papineau (2001). "The Rise of Physicalism." In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), *Physicalism and its Discontents*. Cambridge University Press.

- <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/74162.pdf>

The Explanatory Gap Objections and Replies:

Jaegwon Kim (2005). *Physicalism, or Something Near Enough*. Princeton University Press. Ch.5: "Explanatory Arguments for Type Physicalism and Why They Don't Work." ****Critical discussion of Hill (1991) and others.**

Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). *Naming and Necessity*. Harvard University Press. Extracts in CHALMERS.

David Papineau (2011). "What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?" *Philosophia* 39 (1): 5-19.

Christopher S. Hill (1997). "Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem." Reprinted in CHALMERS

The Multiple Realizability Objection and Replies:

Putnam Hilary (1967). "The Nature of Mental States." Sometimes called "Psychological Predicates." Reprinted in CHALMERS ****Highly influential objection, which paved the way for functionalism.**

Jaegwon Kim (1972). "Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws and the Identity Theory." *The Monist* 56 (April):178-92. ****Skip to section III.**

Thomas W. Polger (2002). "Putnam's Intuition." *Philosophical Studies* 109 (2):143-70.

William P. Bechtel & Robert N. McCauley (1999). "Heuristic Identity Theory (or Back to the Future): The Mind-Body Problem Against the Background of Research Strategies in Cognitive Neuroscience." In Martin Hahn & S. C. Stoness (eds.), *Proceedings of the 21st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society*. Lawrence Erlbaum 67-72.

- <https://mechanism.ucsd.edu/research/hit.htm>

Essay questions (pick one):

- What is the best argument for the type-identity theory? Why is it better than others?
- Why is multiple realization thought to pose a threat to the type-identity theory? Can the theory meet this threat?
- Should type-identity theorists be concerned by the seeming contingency of psycho-physical identities?

Week 2: Physicalism II: Functionalism

Introductory reading:

Ch.6 of HEIL ****Recommended.**

Ch.5 & 6 of KIM

Statements of functionalism:

Putnam Hilary (1967). "The Nature of Mental States." Sometimes called "Psychological Predicates." Reprinted in CHALMERS

Ned Block (1980). "What is Functionalism?" Reprinted in his (2007) book *Consciousness, Representation and Function*. MIT Press.

Janet Levin (2013). "Functionalism." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Section 3 "Varieties of Functionalism" and section 4 "Constructing Plausible Functional Theories."

- Available online: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/>

Objections and Replies:

Ned Block (2007). *Consciousness, Representation and Function*. MIT Press. ****Read the introduction: "Introduction: Remarks on Chauvinism and the Mind-Body Problem"**

Ned Block (1978). "Troubles with Functionalism." Reprinted in CHALMERS. ****This is a small extract of a much longer paper, reprinted in full in Block's (2007) book *Consciousness, Representation and Function*. If reading the longer version, and if you have already read this extract and "What is Functionalism?", then begin at section 3.0 "Chauvinism vs Liberalism."**

David J. Chalmers (1996). *The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory*. Oxford University Press. pp.247-253 only. ****A reply to Block (1978).**

William G. Lycan (1987/1995). *Consciousness*. MIT Press. Ch.3 "Stalking the Tinfoil Man." ****Another reply to Block (1978), but developing other problems for functionalism.**

Functionalism as an Identity-Theory:

David Lewis (1980). "Mad Pain and Martian Pain." Reprinted in his *Philosophical Papers*, Vol.1 ****Recommended**

David M. Armstrong (1981). "The Causal Theory of the Mind." Reprinted in CHALMERS.

Essay questions:

- "In the end, functionalism is both too chauvinistic and too liberal an account of which systems have mental states." Discuss.
- "The most plausible version of functionalism turns out to be a version of the type-identity theory." Discuss.

Week 3: Physicalism III: Non-Reductive Physicalism and Mental Causation

Non-reductive physicalism (background reading):

Ch.11 of HEIL ****Recommended.**

Tim Crane (2001). "The Significance of Emergence." In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), *Physicalism and its Discontents*. Cambridge University Press. ****A clear discussion of non-reductive physicalism**

- http://www.timcrane.com/uploads/2/5/2/4/25243881/significance_of_emergence.pdf

Kim's exclusion/supervenience argument:

Karen Bennett (2007). "Mental Causation." *Philosophy Compass* 2 (2):316-337. ****Section 5 "The Exclusion Problem" and section 6 "The Inheritance Principle."**

Jaegwon Kim (2005). *Physicalism, or Something Near Enough*. Princeton University Press. ****It is recommended that you start here and only tackle *Mind in a Physical World* if seriously interested in this issue.**

- Ch.1, pp.7-22
- Ch.2

Jaegwon Kim (1998). *Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation*. MIT Press. ****Very detailed presentation of the argument and very thorough characterisation of non-reductive physicalism.**

- Ch.2
- Ch.3

Replies to Kim's argument:

Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1990). "Program Explanation: A General Perspective." *Analysis* 50 (2):107-17. ****Kim (1998), pp.72-77 discusses this view in detail.**

Stephen Yablo (1992). "Mental Causation." *Philosophical Review* 101 (2):245-280. Reprinted in CHALMERS. ****Skip sections 5-6.**

Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir & Tim Crane (2013). "There is No Exclusion Problem." In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), *Mental Causation and Ontology*. Oxford University Press.

- http://www.timcrane.com/uploads/2/5/2/4/25243881/there_is_no_exclusion_problem.pdf

Ned Block (2003). "Do Causal Powers Drain Away?" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 67 (1):133-150.

Essay questions:

- What is Kim's causal exclusion problem? What is the most powerful response to it?
- Is non-reductive physicalism incompatible with mental causation? If so, are we entitled to conclude that it must be false?

Week 4: Intentionality I: The Mark of the Mental

Background reading and the derived vs underived distinction:

Alex Byrne (2006). "Intentionality." In J. Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), *The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia*. Routledge. ****Recommended - Skip section 3; notice the distinction between 'derived' and 'underived' intentionality in section 4.**

- <http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/intentionality.html>

John R. Searle (1992). *The Rediscovery of the Mind*. MIT Press. Ch.3, section V: "Intrinsic, As-If and Derived Intentionality." ****More on 'derived' vs 'underived' intentionality.**

Fred Dretske (1995). *Naturalizing the Mind*. MIT Press. Ch.1, Sect 5: "Intentionality." ****Identifies a number of theses associated with the claim that mental states are intentional.**

Ronald McIntyre & David Woodruff Smith (1989). "Theory of Intentionality." In William R. McKenna & J. N. Mohanty (eds.), *Husserl's Phenomenology: A Textbook*. University Press of America. Section 1: "Intentionality."

- www.csun.edu/~vcao087/pubs/intent.pdf

Anti-Intentionalism:

Colin McGinn (1982/1996). *The Character of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford University Press. Ch.1: "Mental Phenomena."

John R. Searle (1983). *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge University Press. Ch.1, section I "Intentionality as Directedness."

Intentionalism:

Tim Crane (1998). "Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental." In *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement*. Cambridge University Press. 229-251. ****Recommended.**

- http://www.timcrane.com/uploads/2/5/2/4/25243881/intentionality_as_the_mark.pdf

Tim Crane (2001). *Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford University Press. Ch.1 "Mind."

Nes vs Crane:

Anders Nes (2008). "Are Only Mental Phenomena Intentional?" *Analysis* 68 (299):205-215

Tim Crane (2008). "Reply to Nes." *Analysis* 68 (299):215-218.

Essay questions:

- What does it mean to say that a mental state is 'intentional'? Are all and only mental states 'intentional'?
- Are bodily sensations intentional?

Week 5: Intentionality II: Is Mental Content Wide?

Background reading:

Joe Lau & Max Deutsch (2014). "Externalism About Mental Content." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Section 1: "Introduction" and Section 2: "The Classic Arguments."

- <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/>

Colin McGinn (1982/1996). *The Character of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford University Press. Ch.5: "Content." ****Notice that McGinn embraces the conclusion that externalism is incompatible with privileged access.**

Motivating externalism (you need read only one of these):

Hilary Putnam (1975). "The Meaning of 'Meaning'." Reprinted in CHALMERS. ****Stop after "Cut the pie any way you like, 'meanings' just ain't in the head!"**

Tyler Burge (1979). "Individualism and the Mental." Reprinted in CHALMERS.

Externalism and mental causation:

Tim Crane (1991). "All the Difference in the World." *Philosophical Quarterly* 41: 1-25. ****Also contains a very direct attempt to refute the twin-earth thought experiments.**

Fred Dretske (1989). "Reasons and Causes." *Philosophical Perspectives* 3: 1-15. ****Attempts to make broad/wide content explanatorily relevant.**

Fred Dretske (2004). "Psychological Vs. Biological Explanations of Behavior." *Behavior and Philosophy* 32 (1):167-177

J. A. Fodor (1980). "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 3: 63-73.

Externalism and Self-Knowledge:

Michael McKinsey (1991). "Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access." Reprinted in CHALMERS.

Anthony L. Brueckner (1992). "What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori." Reprinted in CHALMERS.

Michael McKinsey (2007). "Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent." In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind*. Blackwell.

Anthony L. Brueckner (2007). "Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent." In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind*. Blackwell.

John Heil (1988). "Privileged Access." *Mind* 98 (April): 238-51. ****Defends compatibilism.**

Essay questions:

- Must the claim that externalism is incompatible with privileged first-person access be seen as a *reductio* of externalism? Are the two, in fact, incompatible?
- Is externalism compatible with mental causation?
- Can Dretske's distinction between triggering and structuring causes rescue externalism from the charge of epiphenomenalism?

Week 6: Perception I: Sense-Datum Theories and Representationalism

****When discussing philosophy of perception, 'representationalism' and 'intentionalism' are largely interchangeable terms denoting the conjunction of two theses: (i) that perceptual experience has representational/intentional content (i.e. is a propositional attitude) AND (ii) that perception's phenomenal character can be explained in terms of that content (i.e. there are no perceptual qualia, where qualia = intrinsic, non-representational properties). Crane's intentionalism of past weeks said that *all* mental states are intentional, so was a much broader thesis; it also left open whether there were qualia. Contrast Searle: he is a representationalist/intentionalist in the newly introduced sense, though relative to Crane's intentionalism, we saw he was an anti-intentionalist. In the philosophy of perception, the anti-intentionalist theories are the sense-datum theory and naïve realism. Confusingly, the sense-data theory used to be called the 'representative' theory.**

Background reading:

Tim Crane & Craig French (2015). "The Problem of Perception." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

- <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/> Sections 1, 2, 3.1 and 3.3

William Fish (2010). *Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction*. Routledge. ****The Introduction of the book is very useful and highly recommended.**

Tim Crane (2006). "Is There a Perceptual Relation?" In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), *Perceptual Experience*. OUP. Sections 1-4.

The arguments from illusion and hallucination:

A. J. Ayer (1940). *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*. Sec. I.I "Exposition of the Argument."
****Recommended.**

J. L. Austin (1962). *Sense and Sensibilia*. OUP. Sections I, III and V.

Howard M. Robinson (1994). *Perception*. New York: Routledge. Ch.II.

Statements of representationalism:

Fred Dretske (2003). "Experience as Representation." *Philosophical Issues* 13: 67-82

John Searle (1983). *Intentionality*. CUP. Ch.2, Sec. I, IV, V. ****Note: Searle says he is naïve realist. Currently, philosophers *contrast* naïve realism with intentionalism/representationalism. Confusingly, Searle calls sense-datum theory 'representative,' which likewise reflects outdated terminology.**

The transparency argument for representationalism:

Michael Tye (2002). "Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience." *Noûs* 36: 137-51.

Amy Kind (2008). "How to Believe in Qualia." In Edmond Wright (ed.), *The Case for Qualia*. MIT Press. ****Argues against transparency.**

- http://www1.cmc.edu/pages/faculty/AKind/how_to_believe.pdf

See also Crane (2006) and Dretske (2003).

Essay questions:

- What does it mean to say that perceptual experience is 'transparent'? Is perceptual experience, in fact, transparent?
- What are the arguments from illusion and hallucination? Does the representationalist offer an adequate response to them?

Week 6: Perception II: Naïve Realism and Disjunctivism

Background reading:

James Genone (2016). "Recent Work on Naïve Realism." *American Philosophical Quarterly* 53: 1-27. ****Skip section 3.**

Tim Crane (2006). "Is There a Perceptual Relation?" In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), *Perceptual Experience*. OUP. Section 5.

Tim Crane & Craig French (2015). "The Problem of Perception." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

- <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/> section 3.4 "The Naïve Realist Theory."

Transparency, revisited:

Matthew Kennedy (2009). "Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 79: 574-604. ****Argues that transparency best support naïve realism, not representationalism**

Naïve realism:

Campbell, J. (2002). *Reference and Consciousness*. OUP. Ch.6, Sect.1 and 2. (pp.114-120)

****Recommended. Good for distinguishing naïve realism from intentionalism/representationalism.**

Heather Logue (2012). "Why Naïve Realism?" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 112: 211-237.

James Genone (2014). "Appearance and Illusion." *Mind* 123: 339-376. ****Naïve realist account of illusions.**

Disjunctivism:

Michael G. F. Martin (2004). "The Limits of Self-Awareness." *Philosophical Studies* 120: 37-89. ****Very challenging, but worth it!**

William C. Fish (2008). "Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination." In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. OUP.

Susanna Siegel (2008). "The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination." In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge*. OUP. ****Criticisms of Martin and Fish.**

Essay questions:

- What motivates disjunctivist accounts of perception? Is this motivation as good as disjunctivists take it to be?
- Can the naïve realist adequately account for illusions and hallucinations?
- Which theory of perception is best supported by the transparency of perception?¹
- Is perception a relation to the world or a representation of it?

¹ Do not answer, if you wrote on transparency the previous week.

Week 8: Epistemology of Mind: Other Minds

Background reading:

Alec Hyslop (2014). "Other Minds." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Sections 1-3.

- <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/>

The conceptual and epistemological problems:

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953/2001). *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell. Sections 243-315.
****Don't get too bogged down in this. Just read it over to get a sense of Wittgenstein's concerns.**

Norman Malcolm (1958). "Knowledge of Other Minds." *Journal of Philosophy* 55: 35-52.
****Recommended, since relevant for both questions.**

Colin McGinn (1984) "Consciousness and Other Minds." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume* 58: 119-37. ****The PDF for this article first includes a paper by Christopher Peacocke. Skip straight to section III, p.134, of McGinn's article, "What is the Problem of Other Minds?"**

Akeel Bilgrami (1994). "Other Minds." In J. Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), *A Companion to Epistemology*. Blackwell. ****First few pages recommended for an insightful discussion of Wittgenstein and the conceptual problem.**

Knowledge of others' minds as inferential:

Alec Hyslop & Frank Jackson (1972). "The Analogical Inference to Other Minds." *American Philosophical Quarterly* 9: 168-76.

Robert Pargetter (1984). "The Scientific Inference to Other Minds." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 62: 158-63

Andrew Melnyk (1994). "Inference to the Best Explanation and Other Minds." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 72: 482-91. ****Critical discussion of Pargetter (1984).**

Knowledge of others' minds as perceptual:

Quassim Cassam (2007). *The Possibility of Knowledge*. OUP. Chapter 5.

Anil Gomes (2009). "Other Minds and Perceived Identity." *Dialectica* 63: 219-230. ****Critical discussion of Cassam. Also relates Cassam to the epistemological/conceptual problem.**

Essay questions:

- What are the epistemological and conceptual problems of other minds and how are they related? Does one of them have a greater claim to be 'the' problem of other minds?
- Is knowledge of other minds based on inference? If so, what kind: analogical or scientific? If not, then how else might we know what another is thinking or feeling?

Week 8: Epistemology of Mind: Self-Knowledge

Background reading:

Brie Gertler (2011). *Self-Knowledge*. Routledge. Chapter 5. ****This deals with both inner-perception and displaced perception models.**

Introspection as inner perception (for)

David M. Armstrong (1968/2002). *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*. Routledge. Chapter 15.

Introspection as inner perception (against)

Sydney Shoemaker (1994). "Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture I: The Object Perception Model." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54 (2):249-269 ****Key reading**

Sydney Shoemaker (1994). "Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54 (2):271-290 ****Key reading**

See also:

- Chapter 6, section 5.2, of Gertler (2011) for helpful a discussion of Shoemaker's positive view.
- Chapter 5, section 5.4 of Gertler (2011) for lines of replies against Shoemaker's objections.

Introspection as displaced perception (for)

Fred Dretske (1995). *Naturalizing the Mind*. MIT Press. Chapter 2.

Introspection as displaced perception (against)

Murat Aydede (2003). "Is Introspection Inferential?" In Brie Gertler (ed.), *Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge*. Ashgate

- <http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/maydede/dpm.pdf>

Rationalism (best-saved for later, if revising this topic):

Background reading: Brie Gertler (2011). *Self-Knowledge*. Routledge. Chapter 6.

Richard A. Moran (2001). *Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge*. Princeton University Press. Chapters 2 and 3.

Brie Gertler (forthcoming) "Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.

- <https://pages.shanti.virginia.edu/bg8y/files/2016/02/Self-Knowledge-Rational-Agency5.pdf>

Essay question:

Is introspection a kind of perception? If so, what kind? If not, then why not?